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NOT ON CLAMS ALONE: DETERMINING INDIAN TITLE TO
INTERTIDAL LANDS-United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190 (9th
Cir. 1989)
Abstract: The equal footing doctrine creates a presumption against conveyance of the
beds of navigable waters by the United States prior to statehood. Where submerged lands
lie within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, the presumption may conflict with the
canons of construction applicable in Indian law. In United States v. Aam, the Ninth Cir-
cuit attempted to resolve this conflict by establishing a per se test to determine when the
presumption is rebutted. This Note examines the Ninth Circuit's opinion and concludes
that in light of the respective policies underlying the conflicting doctrines, the court's test
gives insufficient weight to the canons of construction.
United States v. Aam I is one of a number of cases brought in recent
years to determine Indian title to submerged lands.' Collectively,
these cases have involved hundreds of citizens and title to millions of
dollars' worth of land.3 Tribal concerns triggering such actions have
included interests in mineral rights,4 the assertion of regulatory juris-
diction over hunting and fishing on the reservation,5 the environmen-
tal impact of shoreline development on established fisheries,6 and the
preservation of traditional uses.7
The equal footing doctrine creates a presumption against convey-
ance of the beds of navigable waters to private parties by the United
States prior to statehood.8 When the beds of navigable waters within
the boundaries of Indian reservations were not expressly conveyed to a
tribe in the instrument creating the reservation, the presumption con-
flicts with the canons of construction, which require that Indian trea-
ties be construed as the Indians would have understood them.9 In
1. 887 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1989), modified in part Nos. 88-3549, 88-3594 (unpublished Order
Amending Opinion and Denying Rehearing) (filed Jan. 16, 1990).
2. See, eg., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Can. Enters., 713 F.2d 455,
457-458 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d
654 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982 (1983); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v.
Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); United States v. Pend Oreille
County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984); Spokane Tribe v.
Washington, No. 82-753 (E.D. Wash. filed Oct. 13, 1982).
3. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE STATE OF WASHINGTON AND INDIAN TRIBES
17 (1985).
4. See, eg., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
5. See, e-g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
6. Conversation with John Sledd, Attorney for the Suquanish Tribe, Feb. 13, 1990
[hereinafter Conversation with John Sledd] (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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Aam, the Ninth Circuit resolved this conflict by establishing a per se
test to determine when the presumption is successfully rebutted. This
Note concludes that in light of the respective policies underlying the
conflicting doctrines, the court's test gives insufficient weight to the
canons of construction. Rather than clarifying the pertinent analytical
framework, the court further confused the role that the canons of con-
struction play in rebutting the presumption against conveyance.
I. THE SUBMERGED LANDS CONFLICT-EQUAL
FOOTING AND THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
This section discusses the nature of the conflict between the pre-
sumption against conveyance and the canons of construction. The
focus then turns to judicial approaches to its resolution, with particu-
lar emphasis on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Aam.
A. The Conflict Between the Equal Footing Doctrine and the
Canons of Construction
1. Equal Footing Doctrine-The Presumption Against Conveyance
Under the equal footing doctrine, the federal government holds title
to the beds of navigable waters in trust for future states. '0 Title passes
to states when they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an
"equal footing" with established states."' Congress retains the power
to convey lands beneath navigable waters prior to statehood to carry
out public purposes appropriate to the objectives for which the United
States holds the territory.12 One such appropriate public purpose is
the establishment of an Indian reservation. 13
Although retaining the power to convey submerged lands, Congress
has refrained from granting away the beds of navigable waters except
in the face of an international duty or public exigency.' 4 Courts there-
fore have established a presumption against conveyance of submerged
10. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212, 222-23, 229 (1845).
11. Montana, 450 U.S. at 551; Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. at 223, 229.
12. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894). Congress may also grant lands under navigable
waters to "perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the
promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the several states." Id.
13. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556 (citing Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 85
(1918)).
14. Shively, 152 U.S. at 50. The existence of a public exigency is not a constitutional
requirement; the only constitutional stricture is that the disposition of submerged lands be
appropriate to the purposes for which the United States holds the property. Utah Div. of State
Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1987).
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lands to entities other than future states. 5 The policy underlying this
presumption is to prevent piecemeal grants of submerged lands to indi-
vidual proprietors in derogation of public rights. 16
Courts applying the presumption have found congressional intent to
convey beds of navigable waters only if that intent was "definitely
declared or otherwise made very plain."' 7 In circumstances where the
federal government acted with reference to a contemporaneous public
exigency in establishing a reservation, the government's intention to
convey submerged lands has been regarded as "very plain."'" Thus,
where the instrument establishing the reservation did not expressly
convey the submerged lands within it,' 9 resolution of disputes regard-
ing title to those lands has turned on whether the public exigency
exception to the equal footing doctrine applied.20
The public exigency requirement can be met in several ways.
Courts have concluded that public exigencies existed where a tribe
resorted to violence to assure access to the disputed resource,2' where
there was an urgent need to open an area to settlement,22 or where the
Indians depended on the disputed area for their diet or way of life.23
Therefore, court determination that a tribe depended on submerged
lands warrants concluding that those lands were conveyed to the
tribe.24
15. See, eg., Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
16. Shively, 152 U.S. at 50. A grant to a private party is distinguishable from a grant to a
sovereign body such as an Indian tribe. Alaska Pac., 248 U.S. at 88 (a reservation is not in the
nature of a private grant).
17. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).
18. See, eg., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 962 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251,
1259, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
19. Reservations were established by treaties, agreements, executive orders, and statutes. See
generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 127-28 (1982 ed.). Mid-19th
century treaties seldom expressly referred to navigable waters, reflecting that the Court did not
articulate the doctrine requiring express reference in order to reserve those waters until 1894.
See Namen, 665 F.2d at 961, n.27.
20. See, eg., Namen, 665 F.2d at 962. Note the distinction between the public purpose
exception and the public exigency requirement: public purpose speaks to congressional power to
convey submerged lands; public exigency speaks to congressional policy to refrain from
conveying away submerged lands.
21. See Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1260; Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Can. Enters., 713
F.2d 455, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
22. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1970); Namen, 665 F.2d at 962
(specifically applying this exception to Washington Territory).
23. See, eg., Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); cf Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981).
24. See, eg., Namen, 665 F.2d at 962 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 556).
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2. The Canons of Construction-Rebutting the Presumption Against
Conveyance
Long-established canons of Indian treaty construction require that
(1) treaties be construed as the Indians understood them, 5 and (2)
doubtful expressions be resolved in the Indians' favor.2 6 Courts apply
the canons of construction to compensate for the disadvantage in bar-
gaining power the treaty process placed upon Indians and to discharge
the federal trust responsibility.27 Because the canons stem in part
from the special trust relationship between the United States and
Indian tribes, they have been extended to provide for liberal construc-
tion of executive orders, statutes, and agreements in favor of the Indi-
ans.2 ' An additional purpose of the canons is to further the policies
underlying the establishment of Indian reservations, such as preserv-
ing a means of livelihood for the tribes.2 9
In applying the canons of construction to title disputes over beds of
navigable waters, courts consider the relationship of the tribe to the
disputed resource at the time the reservation was established.3" Where
Indians depended on a disputed resource, courts have concluded that
the resource was reserved, because a tribe would not have acceded to
an agreement that denied it access to a needed resource.3
3. Balancing the Equal Footing Doctrine and the Canons of
Construction
When a tribe claims an interest in submerged lands not expressly
conveyed in the instrument establishing the reservation, the equal
footing doctrine may conflict with the canons of construction.32 The
25. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832); see also Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979)
(because the treaties were recorded in English, the United States has a responsibility not to take
advantage of its superior knowledge of the language).
26. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631-32.
27. F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 221. "[lIt cannot be supposed that the Indians were alert to
exclude by formal words every inference which might militate against or defeat the declared
purpose of themselves and the government .... " Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577
(1908).
28. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-381
(1905). See also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
30. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1918); see also Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981).
31. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81.
32. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
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canons do not nullify the presumption against conveyance of sub-
merged lands;33 the canons, however, serve to ease the burden of
rebutting the presumption.34 The few courts faced with the task of
resolving this conflict have balanced the two doctrines on a case-by-
case basis.35
The presumption against conveyance requires the tribe to show that
the government intended to depart from its usual policy of reserving
lands beneath navigable waters for future states.3 6 If a tribe can
demonstrate that a public exigency existed and that the government
was aware of that exigency, it has met its burden of showing the gov-
ernment's intent.37
A tribe's dependence on a disputed resource is one indicator of a
public exigency,38 as well as a way of determining Indian understand-
ing of the terms of the agreement governing the resource.39 Therefore,
dependence is indicative of both government intent and Indian under-
standing.4 Generally, when a tribe has shown some degree of depen-
dence on the disputed resource, the courts affirm. Indian claim to
title.41 In contrast, when proof of dependence is lacking, the courts
reject the Indian claim.42
B. Judicial Analysis of the Submerged Lands Conflict
1. The Supreme Court's Approach-Inconsistent Guidance
The Supreme Court has addressed the question whether Congress
impliedly conveyed submerged lands to Indian tribes in four major
cases.43 The Court, however, has not given consistent guidance on the
33. Montana, 450 U.S. at 567-68 (Stevens, J., concurring).
34. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 962 n.29 (9th Cir.)
(pro-Indian rules of construction should at least weaken the presumption against conveyance,
especially where the controlling treaty was negotiated and ratified long before the presumption
crystallized), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982).
35. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
37. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1258 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
38. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981).
39. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
40. Id.; see also United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1989) (tribe's dependence
on a water's resources is a key factor in determining whether the United States intended to retain
beneficial title on behalf of the tribe).
41. See, eg., Alaska Pac. 248 U.S. at 89-90.
42. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 556.
43. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S.
620 (1970); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
Washington Law Review
extent to which the canons of construction should serve to rebut the
presumption against conveyance.
In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States" and Choctaw Nation v.
State of Oklahoma,45 the Court relied on the canons of construction to
find that title to submerged lands had vested in the Indians. In both
cases, the Court looked to the circumstances surrounding the reserva-
tion's establishment to construe the pertinent language of the instru-
ment creating the reservation.46 In Alaska Pacific, the Court held that
Congress reserved the waters adjacent to the reservation for the Indi-
ans because the Indians depended on the waters for both economic
development and subsistence.47 In Choctaw Nation, the principles of
Indian treaty construction required that title to the riverbed be vested
in the tribe because the treaty establishing the reservation promised
the Indians virtually complete sovereignty over the reserved lands.48
In contrast, in United States v. Holt State Bank' and Montana v.
United States,5° the Court relied on the equal footing doctrine to hold
that submerged lands were not reserved for the Indians. In Holt State
Bank, the Court concluded that in the absence of an instrument spe-
cifically referring to or reserving the disputed area,5 nothing could be
construed as indicating congressional intent.52 The Court likewise
relied on the equal footing doctrine in Montana v. United States to
hold that the United States had retained title to the bed of the Big
Horn River for the future state.53 The Court reasoned that no public
exigency existed because the Crow Tribe depended on buffalo, and
fishing was not important to the Crows' diet or way of life.54 The
44. 248 U.S. at 87, 88-89.
45. 397 U.S. at 634-36.
46. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 634-36; Alaska Pac., 248 U.S. at 87 (relevant circumstances
included the character and location of the reservation, the needs of the Indians, and the object to
be attained by the agreement).
47. Id. at 89 (because Congress intended to assure the economic development and self-
sufficiency of the Indian community, and because the Indians could not have sustained their
community on the upland alone, congressional intent to convey the submerged lands could be
inferred). Alaska Pacific was not strictly an equal footing case, because Alaska was not yet a
state at the time. However, the fact that Montana cited Alaska Pacific with approval indicates
that its holding is applicable to equal footing cases. See infra note 54.
48. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 634-36.
49. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 58 (1926).
50. 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981).
51. Holt State Bank involved a section of the Chippewa Tribe's aboriginal territory which,
though never formally set apart as such, had come to be recognized as a reservation. 270 U.S. at
58. See also Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389 (1902).
52. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58.
53. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556-557.
54. Id. at 556 (citing Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 88 (1918)). Note
that Montana also did not overrule Choctaw Nation. Id. at 555 n.5.
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Court thus implied that had fishing been important to the Crows' diet
or way of life, a public, exigency justifying conveyance of the sub-
merged lands might have existed.
Montana, the Supreme Court's most recent decision, did not apply
the canons of construction." However, even where the Court did not
refer to the canons of construction, 6 the Court regarded a tribe's
dependence on a disputed resource as indicative of both federal and
tribal intent." Lower courts have concluded, therefore, that even
after Montana, the presumption against conveyance must be balanced
against the canons of construction. 8
2. United States v. Aam-The Ninth Circuit's Per Se Test
The Ninth Circuit's approach to determining Indian title to sub-
merged lands in United States v. Aam5 9 drew upon its decision in
Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma.' In Puyallup, the Puyallup
Tribe sued to quiet title to submerged lands exposed when the Army
Corps of Engineers redirected the course of a navigable river.61 In
deciding the question of title to the exposed riverbed, the Ninth Cir-
cuit weighed the equal footingdoctrine against the canons of construc-
tion.62 The Puyallup court held that the government's intent to
convey title to the bed of a navigable body of water is "made very
plain" and must be construed to include the submerged lands when
55. The Montana Court, citing Holt State Bank, appeared to conclude that it need not
consider the canons of construction in its analysis. However, the Montana majority's reliance on
Holt State Bank was based on a misreading of the relevant facts. The reservation in Holt State
Bank was not, as the Montana decision suggested, created by treaty. Holt State Bank did not
apply the canons of Indian treaty construction because the reserved lands had never been the
subject of any treaty, executive order, or act of Congress. See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58; cf
Montana, 450 U.S. at 552. The Court's misreading of Holt State Bank thus should undermine
the conclusion that Montana obviates the need to consider Indian understanding where the equal
footing doctrine is concerned. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 581 n.17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (majority disregarded the rule
that treaties be construed as naturally understood by the Indians) (citing Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)).
57. Alaska Pac, 248 U.S. at 89; see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 556. The Court has also given
substantial weight to dependence in determining Indian title to non-navigable waters. Brewer-
Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 83 (1922); Donnelly v. United States, 228
U.S. 243, 259 (1913). Cf Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949) (upholding tribe's
right to exclusive use of navigable waters).
58. See, eg., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1983),
cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
59. 887 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1989).
60. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983).
61. Id. at 1253.
62. Id. at 1257 (expressing concern with giving both principles "appropriate weight"); see also
United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1989).
Washington Law Review
[a] grant of real property to an Indian tribe includes within its bounda-
ries a navigable water and the grant is made to a tribe dependent on the
fishery resource in that water for survival ... [and] the Government
was plainly aware of the vital importance of the submerged lands and
the water resource to the tribe at the time of the grant.
63
The court explained that its holding illustrated only one set of cir-
cumstances where it is particularly clear that a grant of submerged
lands was made.'
a. Facts and Procedural Background-United States v. Aam
The Port Madison Indian Reservation was established by the 1855
Treaty of Point Elliott65 and was enlarged by order of the Secretary of
Interior in October 1864.66 As enlarged, the reservation included
approximately eleven miles of coastline along Puget Sound. 67 During
the 1880s, much of the land within the reservation was allotted 68 to
individual Indians and eventually transferred to non-Indians, many of
whom subsequently obtained deeds to the abutting tidelands from the
State of Washington.69
After non-Indian landowners took steps to prevent tribe members'
use of the tidelands, the United States and the Suquamish Tribe
brought actions to quiet title to the tidelands adjacent to the reserva-
tion.7° The plaintiffs argued that the treaty reserved the tidelands for
63. Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1258 (citing 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981)). The government's intent to
convey the riverbed was "very plain" because the reservation was enlarged specifically to include
a segment of the river. 717 F.2d at 1261.
64. Id. at 1258 n.7; see also Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Can. Enters., 713 F.2d 455,
457 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
65. Treaty with the Duwamish [and Suquamish] Indians (Treaty of Point Elliott), Jan. 22,
1855, 12 Stat. 927 [hereinafter Treaty of Point Elliott]. The reservation was located with specific
reference to tidelands and to a major Suquamish village located close to the shore. Report from
Michael T. Simmons, Special Indian Agent to Edward R. Geary, Superintendent of Indian
Affairs (July 1, 1860) (need to locate reservation along beach providing good landing, free from
drift, and well-adapted to hauling the seine), quoted in United States v. Aam, Nos. 82-1522, 82-
1549 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 1987) Memorandum Decision at 21 [hereinafter Memorandum
Decision] (unpublished).
66. United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Letter from William P.
Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to W. P. Otto, Acting Secretary of the Interior (Sept. 12,
1864) (calling to his attention the need for immediate action to enlarge the reservation), quoted in
Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 8.
67. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 8.
68. Treaty of Point Elliott, art. VII, supra note 65, at 929 (providing for distribution of
reservation lands to individual tribe members).
69. Aam, 887 F.2d at 192.
70. The two actions were subsequently consolidated. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65,
at 2.
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the tribe's exclusive use.71 The State of Washington and private land-
owners countered that title passed to the state on its admission to the
Union in 1889 pursuant to the equal footing doctrine.72 Because
neither the treaty nor the executive order enlarging the reservation
expressly referred to the tidelands, resolution of the case turned on
whether the tidelands were impliedly included within the expanded
reservation.73
b. The District Court's Analysis
The district court made a number of findings favorable to the tribe.
The court concluded that the Suquamish depended on resources
obtained from tidelands for their survival, that the tidelands adjacent
to the reservation comprised a significant portion of the tribe's most
important tideland resource procurement sites, and that the tribe
would have regarded the disputed tidelands as reserved for their exclu-
sive use.74
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the United States did
not convey the disputed tidelands to the Suquamish Tribe.75 The
court held that the tribe failed to show that the tidelands lay within
the boundaries of the reservation established by the treaty and the sec-
retarial order.76 The court also was unconvinced that a public exi-
gency existed, or that the United States was plainly aware that the
tidelands contained resources important to the tribe.7 7
c. The Ninth Circuit's Decision
In affirming the district court's decision,78 the Ninth Circuit recast
the Puyallup factors into a test requiring that (1) the reservation grant
included the navigable waters within its boundaries; (2) the tribe
depended on the fishery resource in that water for survival; and, (3)
the government was "plainly aware" of the importance of the disputed
resource to the tribe at the time of the grant.7 9 The court questioned
71. Aam, 887 F.2d at 192.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65 at 28. The court also found that the tidelands
adjacent to the reservation were particularly important to the tribe in times of crisis, and that
shellfish such as those found in the tidelands were a staple in the tribe's diet, second in
importance only to the salmon that they caught in nearby waters. Id. at 14-15.
75. Id. at 29 (ostensibly following Puyallup).
76. Id. at 28-29.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1989).
79. Id at 194.
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the district court's conclusion that the tidelands were not part of the
reservation."0 The court, however, affirmed the lower court's decision
because the tribe failed to show either that it depended on the disputed
tidelands for survival, or that the government was plainly aware of the
importance of the tidelands to the tribe.8" The court reasoned that the
tribe did not establish "dependence" because it did not show it
depended on the particular tidelands in dispute for the majority82 of its
subsistence needs. 83 The court suggested that the tribe's treaty rights
of access to off-reservation food resources negated any contention that
the tribe relied on the tidelands for the majority of its subsistence
needs.84
On January 16, 1990, the panel denied a petition for rehearing filed
by the Suquamish Tribe and amended its opinion, deleting the word
"majority" and replacing it with "a significant portion."85 The
amended opinion reads that because the Suquamish did not depend on
the disputed tidelands for "a significant portion" of their subsistence
needs, title to the tidelands vested in Washington State upon its admis-
sion to the Union.86 The court's prior opinion otherwise was
unchanged.
II. THE AAM COURT'S ILL-CONSIDERED TEST
The Aamr court misused the Puyallup analysis by converting the
Puyallup factors into a per se test, and by giving insufficient weight to
the importance of the tidelands to the Indians' way of life. The Aam
court also confused the separate questions of the existence of a public
exigency and government awareness of an exigency. Finally, the court
failed to apply the mandatory canons of construction to the title issue.
The court should have looked to the policies underlying the canons of
construction and the presumption against conveyance to determine
their respective weight.
80. Id. at 195-96 (because the Indians might have understood that the tidelands were
included within reservation boundaries, the question whether they were actually included turned
on whether the tribe depended on the tidelands).
81. Id. at 198. The court also held that because the tribe did not show that it depended on the
disputed tidelands, an inference that the government was plainly aware of the importance of that
resource to the tribe was unwarranted. Id. at 196-97.
82. The court later modified this part of its finding. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text.
83. Aam, 887 F.2d at 196-97.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Aam, Nos. 88-3549, 88-3594 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1990) (Order Amending
Opinion and Denying Rehearing).
86. Id.
722
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A. The "Puyallup Test"
The Aam court mistakenly applied the Puyallup analysis as a test.
Puyallup simply established one clear set of circumstances under
which submerged lands were conveyed. 7 Prior to Aam, the condi-
tions present in Puyallup were sufficient but not necessary to establish
a conveyance. The Aam court converted circumstances sufficing to
establish conveyance into conditions necessary to establish convey-
ance. The court thus abandoned the case-by-case balancing of the
conflicting doctrines and established a per se rule. The establishment
of a per se test unduly restricts the scope of the pertinent analysis.
An example of the potential for inequitable results inherent in this
narrowing of the inquiry lies in the Aam court's failure to clearly dis-
tinguish the question whether the government was plainly aware of the
tribe's dependence from whether there was an alternate basis for find-
ing that a public exigency existed.8" In distinguishing Puyallup and
Muckleshoot, the court intimated that the hostilities threatened or
feared in those cases89 demonstrated the government's awareness of
the tribes' dependence on the disputed resource.9" The court thereby
conflated separate questions of the existence of a public exigency and
government awareness of the public exigency.
Because the Aam court confused these two separate inquiries, the
tribe might have failed the Aam test even if it had shown that it
depended on the disputed resource. 91 In effect, the court required the
tribe to show not just one, but two public exigencies: first, that the
tribe depended on the tidelands, and second, that an additional public
exigency, such as threatened hostilities, existed.92 Such a result
87. Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1258 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Can. Enters., 713 F.2d 455,
457 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). But see Aam, 887 F.2d at 194.
88. See Aam, 887 F.2d at 197.
89. No precedent requires that a "public exigency" be linked to actual or threatened violence.
Such a requirement would penalize peaceful tribes that could be counted on to resolve any
dissatisfaction through negotiation rather than hostilities.
90. Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1251; Muckleshoot, 713 F.2d at 457. The circumstances in
Puyallup provided not one but two separate grounds for finding that a public exigency existed.
In Puyallup, the court could have concluded that a public exigency existed based on either its
finding that the Puyallup Tribe depended on the disputed resource or on the fact that hostilities
had occurred. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
91. See Aam, 887 F.2d at 197. Confusing these inquiries creates a test that begs the question
it purports to answer (whether a public exigency exists depends on whether a public exigency
exists).
92. The circumstances in Aam satisfied even the requirement that there be two demonstrable
bases for finding a public exigency existed. One public exigency existed to the extent that the
Suquamish depended on the disputed tidelands for their diet or way of life. See infra notes
101-14 and accompanying text. A second existed because of the generally perceived, urgent need
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directly contravenes established precedent,93 and demonstrates the
potential for inequities inherent in the Aam court's per se test.
The Aam court also overlooked the fact that the third prong of its
test is subsumed within the second prong. The requirement that the
United States was "plainly aware" of the tribe's dependence on the
disputed resource is only implied and not required by precedent.94
Precedent requires only that the government knew the Indians
depended on certain resources and located the reservation to give
them access to those resources.95 By making "government awareness"
a separate prong of its test, the court overlooked that dependence itself
is indicative of the government's intent where a tribe depended on a
resource and the government acted to preserve the Indians' means of
access to that resource. 96
B. Dependence-The Aam Court Ignored the Tribe's Way of Life
The Aam court improperly analyzed the issue of tribal dependence
on the tidelands. First, the Aam court's suggestion that a tribe be
required to show it depended on the disputed resource for the "major-
ity" of its subsistence needs was unprecedented. 97 That the tidelands
abutting the Port Madison Reservation constituted a significant por-
tion of the tribe's most important tideland procurement sites brought
the facts of Aam well within previously established standards.98 In
amending its opinion, the court appeared to recognize that its equation
of "dependence" with "majority" was unjustified.
Notwithstanding the revision of the original opinion, the Aam deci-
sion is difficult to explain. The opinion now reads that although the
to open the aboriginal territory of the Northwest Indians to non-Indian settlement at the time the
reservation was created. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d
654, 664 (9th Cir.) (a court may infer congressional intent to convey the beds of navigable waters
if the Indians can show they depended heavily on that body of water), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982
(1983).
94. In previous cases, courts have inferred the government's awareness of a public exigency
by looking to such factors as the purpose of the reservation, the nature of the area set aside, the
Indians' understanding of the promises made, and the Indians' way of life. See, e.g., Alaska Pac.
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); compare Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 556 (1981).
95. Thus, the Aam court could have found that the government was "plainly aware" of the
importance of the disputed tidelands to the tribe based on the fact that the reservation was
located with reference to the tidelands. See, e.g., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717
F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
96. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1259 (enough that the tribe depended on the kind of
resources found in the lands at issue).
98. Id.
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tidelands at issue constituted "a significant [sic], although less than a
majority," of the tribe's most important tideland resource procure-
ment sites, the disputed tidelands did not supply "a significant por-
tion" of the tribe's subsistence needs. 99 If "significant" does not mean
"significant," what constitutes dependence becomes an elusive ques-
tion indeed. 1"°
Second, the Aam court mistakenly limited its analysis of "depen-
dence" to bare subsistence requirements. In evaluating dependence,
courts have considered the broader economic importance of the
resource to the tribe,101 as well as the importance of the resource to
the Indians' way of life.102 The Indians of the Northwest relied on fish
and shellfish obtained from rivers and tidelands not only for suste-
nance but for trade with other tribes. 0 3 At the time the treaty with
the Suquamish was signed, the United States was concerned with
minimizing the amount of its financial assistance to the tribe."° Thus,
both the government and the tribe must have intended that the tribe
continue to trade for what it could not procure directly.105
The disputed tidelands in Aam also were important to the tribe as a
means of access to other fishing and food gathering sites on which the
tribe depended for its physical and economic survival.106 Had access
to the waters of Puget Sound beyond the intertidal lands not been
99. See United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1989).
100. The court might have reasoned that even though the tribe depended on the disputed
tidelands for a significant portion of its tideland needs, the tribe did not depend on the tidelands
for a significant portion of its overall needs because of its access to off-reservation procurement
sites. But see infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. This line of reasoning also ignores both
the seasonal obstruction of access to off-reservation resources and the seasonal nature of the
resources themselves.
101. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). The question is fairly
raised whether, in an affluent society like the United States, limiting the analysis of dependence
to bare survival does not merely perpetuate racist stereotypes about Indians that fail to account
for the sophistication and complexity of the cultures and communities that actually existed.
102. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981).
103. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 665 n.7, 666 n.8 (1979).
104. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 12.
105. A resource also may be important precisely because it can be relied on when access to
other sources is obstructed. To hold that resources of such critical importance are not significant
contravenes the plain meaning of "dependence." See Montana, 450 U.S. at 570 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (that the Crow ate fish as a supplement to their buffalo diet and as a substitute for
meat in times of scarcity should have been enough to show the tribe depended on the resource).
106. United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 197 (9th Cir. 1989) (regarding this fact as
"obvious"). Defendants argued that title is not necessary to guarantee access; however, the right
of access does not give the tribe regulatory authority to, for example, limit dredging and filling
that would eliminate those tidelands or the right to build weirs and fishtraps on the intertidal
lands. Conversation with John Sledd, supra note 6.
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assured, the tribe could have been cut off from the salmon and other
fishery resources in those waters. 107 The tidelands thus were vital to
the tribe not only as a procurement site but as a place of guaranteed
access to off-reservation procurement sites.
The Aam court also failed to consider the importance of the tide-
land resources to the Indians' way of life.' 0 8 Montana permits a court
to infer governmental intent to convey lands beneath navigable waters
if the Indians can show they depended on the disputed resource for
"their diet or way of life."' 9 Although the Aam court cited precisely
this language from the Montana decision," ° the court ignored the
question whether the disputed tidelands were important to the
Suquamish way of life."1 This question should have been critical to
the Aam court's analysis."12
Precedent requires that the evaluation of dependence be expanded
beyond subsistence requirements and economic considerations. The
Ninth Circuit has relied on the fact that Indians depended on a dis-
puted watercourse not only for food and materials, but in their manner
of self-identification, language, and religious practices, to hold that a
disputed riverbed was conveyed to the tribe." 3 Earlier cases analyzing
both Indian and government understanding of treaty terms have given
107. Legally, access is probably assured by the Article V rights; practically, however, the fact
that lands have passed into private ownership may impede access.
108. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 14 (the tribe caught salmon, flatfish, herring,
and waterfowl by erecting weirs and fishtraps on the tidelands); Aam, 887 F.2d at 192. The
Suquamish have no rivers large enough to support anadromous fish runs of any size on the Port
Madison Reservation. FishPro, Inc., Assessment of the Floral and Faunal Resources Within the
Port Madison Indian Reservation Intertidal and Subtidal Areas 81 (April 1985) (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review). Tideland food resources include clams, oysters, cockles,
mussels, geoduck, crab, shrimp, squid, and octopus. Id. at 31-34. The tribe cured shellfish for
winter stores and sale, and used them for bait, utensils, implements, ornaments, and currency.
Tribal Request for Determination and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Re Shellfish, United
States v. Washington, Civil No. 9213-Phase 1, subproceeding No. 89-3 (filed May 19, 1989) at 4.
109. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556.
110. Aam, 887 F.2d at 193.
111. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the extent to which the way of life of all the
tribes of the Pacific Northwest focused on the watercourses. See Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 665-66, 683-84 (1979).
112. When a reservation did not suit the Indians' needs, they might resort to violence. See,
e.g., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
113. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Can. Enters., 713 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1983)
(applying the Puyallup analysis), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). See also United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
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substantial weight to a reservation's location with reference to the
wants and habits of the Indian signatories.'
14
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that access to off-reservation
fishing and gathering sites somehow negated the Suquamish Tribe's
dependence on the tidelands was both unjustified and unprecedented.
Article V of the treaty provides that, in addition to reserving specified
areas for their exclusive use, the Suquamish reserve the right to fish off
the reservation in common with the citizens of the state.1 i Every pre-
vious decision" 6 in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a tribe's claim to
submerged lands involved treaties with similar provisions." 7 Neither
the treaty nor previous case law suggests that one right should sup-
plant the other. Rather, such off-reservation procurement rights were
intended to complement a life defined by permanent homes." 8 If any-
thing, the inclusion of clauses providing for continued access to off-
reservation fishing sites underscores the importance of the tidelands to
the tribes."19
114. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Moore v. United States,
157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946), (reserving to the Indians a "tract sufficient for their wants"), cert
denied, 330 U.S. 827 (1947). Governor Stevens intended that the location and extent of the
reservations should be adapted to the peculiar wants and habits of the different tribes. Report
from Governor Stevens to George W. Manypenny, Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Sept. 16,
1854), cited in Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 18.
115. Treaty of Point Elliott, art. V, supra note 65, at 928. The scope of the Article V rights
was not at issue in this case. United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 195 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Suquamish Tribe has since brought suit to determine the scope of its Article V shellfish gathering
rights. Tribal Request for Determination and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Re Shellfish,
United States v. Washington, Civil No. 9213-Phase 1, subproceeding No. 89-3 (filed May 19,
1989) at 4.
116. See, eg., Muckleshoo4 713 F.2d at 456 (the Muckleshoots were parties to both the
Medicine Creek Treaty and Treaty of Point Elliott.)
117. See, eg., Treaty with the Nisquallys (Medicine Creek Treaty), Dec. 26, 1854, art. III, 10
Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31,
1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty of Olympia (Treaty with the Quillayutes), July 1, 1855 and Jan. 25,
1856, 12 Stat. 971. Governor Stevens understood that assuring the Pacific Northwest Indians of
their continued right to fish was an indispensable requirement in securing their agreement to the
treaties. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING
RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 21 (1970).
118. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 407 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
119. Using the existence of off-reservation fishing and gathering rights to justify the
conclusion that a tribe was not dependent on a disputed resource leads to inequitable results.
Tribes to whom off-reservation fishing rights were so important that they insisted on their
inclusion in the treaty would find it harder to show dependence than tribes that did not insist on
the inclusion of off-reservation fishing rights because they were less important.
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C. The Aam Court Failed to Apply the Canons of Construction to
the Title Issue
While the Aam court acknowledged that treaties should be con-
strued according to the probable understanding of the original tribal
signatories, it arbitrarily limited its consideration of Indian under-
standing to whether the tidelands were within reservation bounda-
ries."O The court did not explain why Indian understanding was
irrelevant to the Indians' claim that they owned the tidelands. Prior
case law does not suggest that the canons of construction are relevant
only to the location of reservation boundaries. 121
The court's failure to consider Indian understanding with regard to
title was even more curious in view of the district court's finding that
the Indians would have regarded the tidelands as being for their exclu-
sive use.122 Governor Stevens assured the Suquamish that, in return
for sharing their many off-reservation procurement sites with non-
Indians, the area close to their homes would be set apart for their
exclusive use.1 23 That assurance should have prompted inquiry into
the Indians' understanding of such a declaration.
Similarly, in assuring the Suquamish in general terms that the area
included in the reservation would be reserved for their exclusive use,
the government gave the tribe no reason to suspect that the nature of
their title changed abruptly at the high tide line.' 24 The canons of
construction mandate that ambiguities such as that created by Gover-
nor Stevens' assurances be construed in favor of the Indians. 125
D. Weighing the Policies Behind the Canons of Construction and
the Equal Footing Doctrine
In balancing the presumption against conveyance126 and the canons
of construction, courts should consider the relative importance of the
120. See United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1989).
121. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
122. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 16. The Indians were unfamiliar with the
non-Indian concepts of title and alienability. Id. However, the Indians recognized the related
right of individual bands or tribes to make exclusive use of a given area. See Puyallup Indian
Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 525 F. Supp. 65, 71 (W.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
123. Memorandum Decision, supra note 65, at 16, 18.
124. The Indians viewed land as an extended plain, parts of which were always covered by
water, other parts of which were at times covered by the tide and uncovered at other times.
Appellant's Excerpts of Record at 141, Suquamish Tribe v. Aam, No. 82-1522, (filed Feb. 5,
1988).
125. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
126. The presumption against conveyance is derived from cases where submerged lands were
claimed as a result of alleged grants to individuals or private corporations. See Shively v.
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respective policies underlying the two doctrines. The public exigency
requirement reflects a policy of preventing the piecemeal distribution
of submerged lands to private parties prior to a state's admission to the
Union.1 27 After statehood, the states are not constrained from making
piecemeal distributions of submerged lands to private individuals.128
In contrast, the canons of construction reflect equitable considera-
tions that constrain the states as well as the federal government in
construing instruments affecting Indian rights.129 The canons of con-
struction discharge the federal trust responsibility and compensate for
the disadvantage in bargaining power at which the treaty process
placed the Indians. 3 ' The canons also reflect a concern that the fed-
eral government abide by its promises.1 3 ' The policy underlying the
presumption against conveyance thus lacks the force of the policies
that underlie the canons of construction.
The general policies underlying the establishment of Indian reserva-
tions also merit substantial consideration in determining what the gov-
ernment intended to reserve on behalf of the Indians. For example,
one purpose of establishing Indian reservations was to promote Indian
self-sufficiency and economic development. 3 2 Thus, where a resource
was a necessary link in achieving that purpose, the government's
intent should be inferred based on its underlying policy, even if no
express intent to convey that particular resource was documented.
Once the tribe has shown that a public exigency existed, an inference
that the government intended to convey the submerged lands should
arise. The canons of construction should thus operate to shift the bur-
den of proving that the federal government's intention was otherwise
to the party challenging the conveyance.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891). Because a tribe is a quasi-
sovereign entity, and because reservations were reserved by the Indians rather than granted by
the United States, the reservation of submerged lands for an Indian tribe does not undermine the
policy against piecemeal conveyance to private individuals prior to statehood. See Barsh and
Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence" Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After
Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 27 (1981), cited in United States v. Aranson, 696
F.2d 654, 664 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982 (1983).
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
128. For example, portions of the tidelands at issue inAam were distributed to private parties
by Washington State. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
129. See generally supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 25 (one reason for the unequal bargaining positions of the United States
and the Indians was the fact that treaties were recorded in English).
131. See ag., Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.").
132. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, to the extent that the Indians depended on interpreters
provided by the United States to explain treaties, tribal understanding
should be regarded as indicative of government intent and the burden
placed on the party opposing the conveyance to show a contrary gov-
ernment intent. Courts also should bear in mind that the presumption
against conveyance and the public exigency exception were not
expressly announced by the courts until 1894.133 It is unreasonable to
expect that, decades earlier, government negotiators, let alone the
Indians, should have anticipated the necessity of including specific lan-
guage to rebut the as yet unarticulated presumption against
conveyance. 134
The Aam court should have looked to the policies underlying the
canons of construction and the presumption against conveyance to
determine their respective weight. In that light, the district court's
findings as to the significance of the disputed tidelands to the tribe
justified the conclusion that the Suquamish depended on the tidelands.
The Indians' dependence on the tidelands should in turn have given
rise to an inference that the United States intended to reserve the tide-
lands on behalf of the tribe. The burden of showing that the govern-
ment's intent was otherwise should consequently have shifted to the
parties challenging the Suquamish claim of title to the intertidal lands
abutting the reservation.
III. CONCLUSION
In determining title to the beds of navigable waters on Indian reser-
vations, courts have been uncertain as to the respective weight due the
presumption against conveyance and the canons of construction. The
per se test established by the Aam court crystallized an illogical and
inequitable resolution to this conflict. The question should instead be
resolved by looking to the policies underlying the respective doctrines.
The serious equitable considerations that underlie the canons of con-
struction applicable in Indian law outweigh the lesser concern of dis-
couraging piecemeal distributions of submerged lands to private
parties. Therefore, when a tribe can show that a public exigency
existed, the burden should shift to the party challenging the reserva-
tion to demonstrate that the United States did not intend to reserve
the submerged lands for the tribe.
Andrea Geiger Oakley
133. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 19.
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